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Abstract
We analyze the correlations of daily price returns for nine major cryptocurrencies between April 2013
and November 2018 and estimate their evolution using bivariate and multivariate modelling approaches.
We detect pronounced time variation and find these correlations to be generally increasing between
early 2017 and late 2018. We then adopt a right-tail variation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit
root test to identify and date-stamp periods of mildly explosive behavior (statistical instability) in
the time series of the Network Value to Transactions (NVT) ratio (a measure of the dollar value of
cryptocurrency transaction activity relative to its network value) of six cryptocurrencies. We show
statistically significant evidence of mild explosiveness in all of them. At the end of 2017 and in 2018,
several major cryptocurrencies experience significant (often simultaneous) instability associated with
rising NVT ratios. Instability is a steady feature of cryptocurrency markets.
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1 Introduction
Cryptocurrencies (or virtual currencies) are relatively new forms of currencies that allow electronic pay-
ments between individuals without financial intermediation and transactions without fees. Often, they
offer anonymity. From a technical point of view, the key innovation introduced with these currencies
is the implementation of cryptographic identification protocols into a “distributed ledger”. Cryptocur-
rencies work on digital records thanks to which it is possible to track and validate all payments at any
point in time. By design, cryptocurrencies can be used in a decentralized payment system that is not
necessarily controlled by central banks nor any other financial institutions and that is able to prevent
“double spending”. Since its launch in January 2009, Bitcoin (BTC) has been the most well-known
and widely used cryptocurrency. Over the years, it has attracted attention from the media, investors,
professionals, academic economists, monetary authorities, governments, and regulators. Compared with
“conventional” currencies, cryptocurrencies are still a relatively limited monetary phenomenon. However,
from a financial investment point of view, for several reasons, they have slowly become quite relevant.
Academic research on cryptocurrencies was very sparse until not long ago. Lately, however, a rich
collection of research papers and articles examining the many properties and characteristics of cryptocur-
rencies has been written and circulated. Such research has been spurred by growing interest in Bitcoin
and other virtual currencies as novel, and potentially lucrative, investment vehicles and by months of
turbulence and high volatility in virtual currency markets. Especially in 2018, many cryptocurrencies,
and Bitcoin in particular, were at the center of speculation and distress. Some serious turmoil in several
of these markets picked up again in 2019. Therefore, it is not surprising that significant empirical work in
this infant, but expanding, literature has concerned cryptocurrency prices and their unstable dynamics.
Questions about what characteristics affect cryptocurrency prices and whether their entire market is
built on speculation are numerous. Cheah and Fry (2015) empirically document the presence of bubbles in
Bitcoin; Corbet et al. (2018a) look for bubbles in Bitcoin and Ethereum (ETH, another major cryptocur-
rency); Hafner (2018) finds general evidence in favor of bubbles in eleven of the largest cryptocurrencies;
and Bouri et al. (2019) search for bubbles in a set of seven leading cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin; Ripple,
XRP; Ethereum; Litecoin, LTC; Nem, XEM; Dash, DASH; and Stellar, XLM).1 According to Fry and
Cheah (2016), from an economic point of view, Bitcoin is, paradoxically, interesting due to its lack of
clarity. Fry (2018) develops bespoke rational bubble models for cryptocurrencies, shows that liquidity
risks generate heavy-tails in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency markets, provides evidence of bubbles in
Bitcoin and Ethereum, and argues that the lack of economic clarity may even cause cryptocurrency prices
to collapse completely. Indeed, some recent research classifies Bitcoin as a speculative asset, rather than
1
a genuine currency (for example, Baek and Elbeck, 2015). Gandal et al. (2018) demonstrate that, in
late 2013, suspicious trading activity likely caused an unprecedented surge in the Bitcoin price, which
increased from US$150 to more than US$1000 in just two months; and conclude that unregulated cryp-
tocurrency markets remain vulnerable to manipulation today. Budish (2018) outlines a simple theoretical
model in which he shows that Bitcoin would be even more prone to a “majority attack”, if it became
sufficiently economically important – for example, if it became a store of value akin to gold. He also
argues that there are intrinsic limitations to how economically important Bitcoin can become. On a
slightly different note, Bolt and Van Oordt (2019) develop a theoretical framework thanks to which they
determine that the exchange rate (or price, expressed in a given “conventional” currency) of a cryptocur-
rency depends positively on the volume of the payments for goods and services with that virtual currency
(transaction value or volume) and on the quantity of virtual currency held in a speculative position;
and negatively on the velocity of the cryptocurrency and on the total quantity of a cryptocurrency in
circulation. They maintain that a speculative position reduces the quantity of virtual currency available
to facilitate real payments and, therefore, increases the value of that currency. Their model predicts
that, as a cryptocurrency becomes more established, its price will become less sensitive to the impact
of shocks to speculators’ beliefs. This prediction undermines the conventional wisdom that high price
volatility will prevent widespread use of a virtual currency. Finally, Bhambhwani et al. (2019) challenge
the popular notion that cryptocurrency markets are simply plagued with bubbles and speculative trad-
ing, and statistically determine that two main factors drive, instead, cryptocurrency prices in the long
run: trustworthiness of the blockchain of a cryptocurrency (measured by its computing power) and the
adoption of the blockchain itself (measured by the size of its network).
From a slightly different angle, Urquhart (2016), Nadarajah and Chu (2017), Tiwari et al. (2018), and
Khuntia and Pattanayak (2018) study the efficiency properties of Bitcoin. Makarov and Schoar (2019)
argue that cryptocurrency markets exhibit periods of large and recurrent arbitrage opportunities across
exchanges, and find that Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple prices may differ across exchanges for weeks.
Gkillas and Katsiampa (2018) examine the tail behavior of major cryptocurrencies; they find Bitcoin Cash
(BCH) to be the riskiest cryptocurrency and Bitcoin and Litecoin to be the least risky. Urquhart (2017)
investigates Bitcoin price clustering. Phillip et al. (2018) write about some unique statistical features of
cryptocurrencies. Yermack (2015) discusses to what extent Bitcoin can be considered a currency.
Several authors have investigated the relationship between the price returns of limited sets of cryp-
tocurrencies and the returns of conventional assets. One of the objectives of these studies is to shed
light on the possible ways, if any, cryptocurrencies can be included in financial portfolios. Studying the
relationship between virtual currencies and other assets, or even financial and macroeconomic variables,
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may be useful to investors, forecasters, economists, and policy makers, especially if one considers that
cryptocurrencies may, in principle, become economically and financially significant in the future. Bouri
et al. (2017), Corbet et al. (2018b), Selmi et al. (2018), Platanakis et al. (2018), for example, describe
the hedging and diversification benefits of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies. Koutmos (2018) analyzes
the relationship between transaction activity and Bitcoin price returns. Liu and Tsyvinski (2018) show
that the returns of Bitcoin, Ripple, and Ethereum have low exposures to traditional asset classes (stocks,
currencies, and commodities) and to common macroeconomic factors. They find that the behavior of
these cryptocurrencies is not driven by their function as a stake in the future of blockchain technology
(similar to stocks), nor as a unit of account (similar to currencies), nor as a store of value (similar to
some metal commodities). They also demonstrate that cryptocurrency returns can be predicted by two
factors specific to their markets (momentum and investors attention) and that supply factors such as
mining costs, price-to-dividend ratios, or realized volatility are not useful for predicting their dynamics.
To our knowledge, despite the developing attention to cryptocurrencies as digital assets, the existing
literature is still lacking convincing empirical evidence on the properties of virtual currencies as new
investment options. In this paper, we fill this gap by considering cryptocurrencies as a separate asset class,
of interest for financial investment purposes. We are concerned with only two of their many characteristics,
(i) the way their prices move with respect to each other and (ii) their unstable dynamic behavior. First,
unlike previous academic research, we empirically examine the extent of price return comovement within
a broad set of nine dominant cryptocurrencies. We define comovement as the correlation coefficient
between price returns and, pair by pair, model its evolution by means of bivariate and multivariate
econometric methods. Second, using state-of-the-art recursive methods, we look for and date-stamp
periods of instability (or distress, or bubble-like behavior) in a subset of six cryptocurrency markets.
Gronwald (2019) points out that a number of recent papers on cryptocurrency bubbles are problematic
due to an insufficient consideration of the fundamental value of cryptocurrencies. To partially address this
issue, he conducts an investigation on bubbles in Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, and Litecoin by expressing
Ethereum, Ripple, and Litcoin prices in terms of Bitcoin prices (assuming that Bitcoin is the leading
cryptocurrency), and by implementing methods similar to those that we adopt in this work. We concur
with his argument and, different from what has been done in this literature, we do not base our empirical
scrutiny on mere price data. Rather, we propose the adoption of a new and innovative, yet easily
computable, measure of cryptocurrency relative value, the Network Value to Transactions (NVT) ratio.
As we explain in Section 2, this measure allows for convenient and direct (although still somewhat
imperfect) utility comparisons across cryptoassets, even more so than simple prices do.
Because of the absence of a solid theory of cryptocurrency prices and because of a currently poor grasp
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of how such prices are related to each other, we are reluctant to start out with explicit hypotheses to
be then tested empirically. The consideration of how technologically different most cryptocurrencies are
lead us to believe that the degree of comovement across their price returns should be generally expected
to be low.2 The informal observation of how cryptocurrency markets have evolved suggests that many
of these currencies should be found to be characterized by frequent and pronounced episodes of distress.
In this paper, we explore certain patterns in the data without resorting to any specific conjectures nor
speculations. The ultimate goal is to provide a comprehensive set of clear and statistically robust empirical
facts about virtual currency price dynamics. The general objective is then twofold: (i) to help determine if,
how, and to what extent such currencies can be bundled together to create investment portfolios; and (ii)
to offer some observational guidance for the formulation of some theoretical foundations of cryptocurrency
behaviors. After all, even policymakers moved from neglect, to banning, to showing some interest in the
blockchain technology and crytpocurrencies. As a matter of fact, a thorough understanding of the main
features of cryptocurrency markets may be also useful for protecting financial stability.
We work on a daily dataset of nine major cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin, Ripple, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash,
Stellar, EOS, Litecoin, Cardano (ADA), and Monero (XMR). According to CoinMarketCap (an online
platform that tracks cryptocurrency capitalization), total cryptocurrency market capitalization reached a
peak of about US$800B in January 2018 (it was still at US$30B in April 2017), at a time when Bitcoin’s
dominance was about 35%, after steadily fluctuating above 80% for years until February 2017.3 By
the end of November 25, 2018 (the day that, as we mention in Section 2, we elect as the end of our
sample of data), 2071 cryptocurrencies and other electronic coins and tokens were traded on the global
market. Their total market capitalization was US$129.4B. On that day, Bitcoin represented 53.93% of the
market and its price was US$4009.97. The corresponding dominance figures for the other cryptocurrencies
were: Ripple 11.68% (second most dominant cryptocurrency overall, price of US$0.374551), Ethereum
9.31% (third cryptocurrency, price of US$116.45), Bitcoin Cash 2.49% (fourth cryptocurrency, price of
US$184.58), Stellar 2.36% (fifth cryptocurrency, price of US$0.159607), EOS 2.35% (sixth cryptocurrency,
price of US$3.35), Litecoin 1.42% (seventh cryptocurrency, price of US$30.89), Cardano 0.76% (ninth
cryptocurrency, price of US$0.037725), and Monero 0.75% (tenth cryptocurrency, price of US$58.05).
Together, these cryptocurrencies accounted for 85.04% of the total market.
Conditions change rapidly in these markets. For example, by the end of June 9, 2019, 2225 cryp-
tocurrencies and other electronic coins and tokens were traded on the global market, with a total market
capitalization of US$244.1B. Bitcoin took the lion’s share again and represented 55.80% of the market; its
price was US$7688.08. The corresponding dominance figures for the other cryptocurrencies in the sam-
ple were: Ripple 6.71% (third most dominant cryptocurrency overall, price of US$0.388266), Ethereum
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10.14% (second cryptocurrency, price of US$233.09), Bitcoin Cash 2.78% (fifth cryptocurrency, price of
US$381.17), Stellar 0.95% (tenth cryptocurrency, price of US$0.119915), EOS 2.32% (sixth cryptocur-
rency, price of US$6.17), Litecoin 2.93% (fourth cryptocurrency, price of US$115.13), Cardano 0.84%
(eleventh cryptocurrency, price of US$0.079470), and Monero 0.58% (thirteenth cryptocurrency, price of
US$83.78). These nine cryptocurrencies accounted for 83.04% of the total market.
A few months later, on September 22, 2019, the 2379 cryptocurrencies in the market exhibited a total
capitalization of US$265.4B. Bitcoin had a dominance of 67.1% and traded at US$10070.39, just hours
before suddenly collapsing again to about US$8000. The nine cryptocurrencies that we include in the
sample of the present study accounted for 86.61% of the total market.
As we carry out our empirical analysis, we provide statistical evidence of pronounced time variation
in the comovement of cryptocurrency price returns. Generally low to moderately positive, we find it to be
drastically increasing for all pairs of cryptocurrencies between early 2017 and late 2018.4 We also detect
statistically significant bubble-like behavior or distress in the subset of cryptocurrencies for which this
specific empirical investigation is possible. The periods of turmoil that we identify are numerous, but not
necessarily synchronized across cryptocurrencies. However, we show that several major cryptocurrencies
(including Bitcoin and Litecoin) experience significant and almost simultaneous distress in the second
half of 2018. We argue that instability is an extensively common trait of cryptocurrency markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the dataset. In Section 3,
we explain how we measure the comovement of cryptocurrency price returns, outline how we model its
time evolution, and present the empirical results. In Section 4, based on some very recent econometric
literature, we provide a statistical definition of instability (bubble-like behavior and/or distress) in a
variable of interest, summarize the econometrics that we implement to detect and date-stamp periods of
unstable dynamics in the cryptocurrency NVT ratios in the sample, and report the empirical outcomes.
We conclude with a brief discussion of our findings and some of their implications in Section 5.
2 Data Overview
A daily dataset of cryptocurrency prices is collected from Coin Metrics, a recently founded provider of
crypto asset market and network data. Samples are cryptocurrency-specific, given that virtual currencies
were designed and introduced into the market at different times in the last ten years or so. All time series
end on 11/25/2018. The starting dates are 04/28/2013 for Bitcoin (2038 daily observations), 08/04/2013
for Ripple (1940 daily observations), 08/07/2015 for Ethereum (1207 daily observations), 07/31/2017 for
Bitcoin Cash (483 daily observations), 08/05/2014 for Stellar (1574 daily observations), 07/01/2017 for
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EOS (513 daily observations), 04/28/2013 for Litecoin (2038 daily observations), 10/01/2017 for Cardano
(421 daily observations), and 05/21/2014 for Monero (1650 daily observations).5
In the first part of this work, we adopt a bivariate statistical approach based on Tang and Xiong (2012)
and a multivariate one based on Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002) to analyze the comovement
of nine cryptocurrency daily price returns, all derived as the first differences of the natural logarithm of
daily prices. In the second part, we look for periods of instability in cryptocurrency markets. As we
describe in Section 4, for this specific empirical investigation, we adopt similar econometric techniques
as in Cheah and Fry (2015), Corbet et al. (2018a), Hafner (2018), and Bouri et al. (2019). However,
unlike these authors, who all search for instability in cryptocurrency prices and/or price indices, we
do so by examining the statistical properties of different data. Following the statistical methodologies
proposed in Phillips and Yu (2011) and Phillips et al. (2015), we identify periods of mildly explosive
behavior (bubbles and/or distress) in the time series of the NVT ratio of six of the cryptocurrencies in
the sample, namely Bitcoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash, Stellar, Litecoin, and Cardano. As suggested in
Coin Metrics, for each of these six cryptocurrencies, we construct these ratios by simply dividing market
capitalization levels (i.e., the total market value of all tokens in circulation expressed in US Dollars)
by associated transaction volumes (i.e., an estimate of the value of on-chain transaction activity drawn
from block explorers and blockchains, expressed in US Dollars).6 As its creators mention, the NVT
metric is intended to capture the efficacy of a currency at manifesting the property of being a medium of
exchange. It measures the dollar value of cryptoasset transaction activity relative to network value and
compares how units of on-chain transactions are priced in the market across different networks. For a
cryptocurrency to intermediate effectively, it must have sufficient on-chain volumes. A high NVT ratio
(or an NVT ratio that increases quickly over time) generally indicates that the currency is expensive (or
is getting more expensive) relative to its actual transaction volume. It could indicate optimism on the
part of investors, who might be assuming that transaction volumes (and hence utility) will increase in
the future, or (maybe ongoing) overvaluation of the cryptocurrency. Conversely, a low NVT ratio (or a
rapidly falling NVT ratio) may be a sign of (perhaps ongoing) undervaluation, or pessimism about the
future prospects of the currency. The NVT ratio could be compared to a conventional price-to-earnings
ratio. Of course, cryptocurrency volumes are not analogous to earnings; rather, they represent a measure
of the underlying utility of a cryptocurrency.
However, the NVT ratio is not a perfect measure of the relative value of a cryptocurrency. In its
standard and original formulation, it relies on a flawed market capitalization indicator and is constructed
on a generally problematic measure of transaction volumes.7 As extensively documented in Coin Met-
rics, for most cryptocurrencies, getting accurate estimates of the actual economic throughput of public
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blockchains is not trivial. Due to the existence of mixers, self-churn, privacy enhancements, spam, and
change outputs, raw estimates of transactional value are often misstated by a factor of five, ten, or more.
To partially address these issues, for the computation of the NVT ratios, we make use of Coin Metrics’s
recently released adjusted transaction volume estimates (expressed in US Dollars). From the perspective
of the blockchain, all transactions are equally valid; however, for an economist or investor, this new (and
different) measure is claimed to be more useful because it is able to isolate the most meaningful economic
transactions of each currency. Despite these caveats, NVT ratios still represent a straightforward way to
look at the relative utility of competing cryptoassets in a more or less comparable manner.
All NVT ratio time series end on 11/25/2018. They start on 04/28/2013 for Bitcoin (2038 daily
observations), 08/07/2015 for Ethereum (1207 daily observations), 08/03/2017 for Bitcoin Cash (480
daily observations), 11/02/2015 for Stellar (1120 daily observations), 04/28/2013 for Litecoin (2038 daily
observations), and 10/02/2017 for Cardano (420 daily observations).
3 Measuring the Comovement of Cryptocurrency Price Returns
We study the comovement of M = 9 cryptocurrency price returns in two different, albeit complementary,
ways. First, we model the time evolution of their unconditional correlations with a bivariate rolling
regression approach. However, this methodology only considers two price returns at a time and, as such,
is not able to exploit all the dynamic (simultaneous and non-simultaneous) interrelations that are present
in the full set of returns in the sample. To address this issue, we then describe the dynamic (un)conditional
correlations between price returns by estimating a battery of dynamic conditional correlation multivariate
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (DCC MV-GARCH) models, which also allow
for the estimation of time-varying conditional volatilities for each returns series. This way, we are able
to capture and utilize at once all the information embedded in our sample of cryptocurrency prices.
3.1 Rolling Unconditional Correlations
We adopt a bivariate approach to compute rolling unconditional correlations between cryptocurrency price
returns, as in Tang and Xiong (2012). First, we rescale all daily cryptocurrency price returns by subtract-
ing their respective means and dividing by their respective standard deviations, r∗m,t =
rm,t−rm√∑T
t=1(rm,t−rm)
2
T−1
.
Then, we regress the rescaled returns of cryptocurrency x, r∗x,t, on the rescaled returns of cryptocurrency
z, r∗z,t, with x, z = 1, 2, ...,M and x 6= z. ̂˜ρxz obtained from regression r∗x,t = µ + ρ˜xzr∗z,t + ηt is the
estimated unconditional correlation between the two cryptocurrency price returns. We assess the time-
variation in the correlation coefficients between all pairs of price returns by estimating rolling regressions
7
with fixed windows of lengths equal to 30 and 60 days. We correct for autocorrelation in the residuals
by computing Newey-West standard errors, based on a Bartlett kernel and a fixed bandwidth, which are
used to derive reliable rolling (approximately) 95% confidence intervals for ρ˜xz.
3.2 Dynamic (Un)Conditional Correlations
The bivariate rolling correlations that we discuss in Section 3.1 can only provide a partial picture of
comovement between cryptocurrency price returns, as they fail to take into account the cross-dynamics
within the full set of virtual currencies in the sample and, to an extent, are susceptible to changes when
different lengths for the rolling windows are selected. We focus again on the time dimension of the data
and, to check the robustness of the previous results, we assess how (un)conditional correlations between
cryptocurrency price returns evolve over the years in a multivariate setting.
We estimate M−1 = 8 DCC MV-GARCH models, as in Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002).
Each time, we first estimate a univariate GARCH model for each returns series and then derive a mul-
tivariate conditional correlation estimator from the transformed residuals of the first-stage models. The
resulting conditional correlation coefficients, at each point in time, are a function of past correlations and
of the history of the conditional volatility of each returns series. The implemented multivariate GARCH
models assume that, respectively, S = M,M − 1,M − 2, ..., 2 demeaned cryptocurrency price returns are
conditionally multivariate normal with expected value equal to zero and time-varying covariance matrix,
Ht. A dynamic conditional correlation DCC(J,K) MV-GARCH(P,Q) model is estimated on the trans-
formed returns r̂m,t = rm,t − rm, where rm =
∑T
t=1 rm,t
T . Let r = (r1, r2, ..., rS)
′, r̂t = (r̂1,t, r̂2,t, ..., r̂S,t)′,
r̂t ∼ N (0, Ht), and Ht = DtRtDt. Dt is the S × S diagonal matrix of time-varying conditional standard
deviations from S univariate GARCH models.
√
hm,t is the m
th element of the main diagonal of Dt
and Rt is a time-varying conditional correlation matrix.
8 Each hm,t follows a univariate GARCH model,
hm,t = ωm +
∑Pm
p=1 αm,pr̂
2
m,t−p +
∑Qm
q=1 βm,phm,t−q, for m = 1, 2, ..., S.
9 For each price return, Pm and
Qm are integers between 1 and 30 that do not need to be the same and whose selection is based on the
Schwarz Information Criterion. In this work, P = (P1, P2, ..., PS)
′ and Q = (Q1, Q2, ..., QS)′.
Ut =
(
1−∑Jj=1 γj −∑Kk=1 δk)U + ∑Jj=1 γj(ε̂t−j ε̂′t−j) + ∑Kk=1 δkUt−k is the conditional dynamic
correlation process used to model the data. ε̂t ∼ N (0, Rt) is the vector of standardized residuals from
the multiple OLS regressions r̂t = θ+ t. U is the unconditional covariance of the standardized residuals
from the first-stage estimation. We assume that Rt = (U
∗
t )
−1 Ut (U∗t )
−1, where
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U∗t =

√
u11,t 0 0 ... 0
0
√
u22,t 0 ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... 0
0 ... 0 0
√
uSS,t

,
such that U∗t is a diagonal matrix composed of the square root of the diagonal elements of Ut. Under
suitable conditions, the elements of Rt have the form ρ
∗
xz,t =
uxz,t√
uxx,tuzz,t
, with x, z = 1, 2, ..., S. In our
application, θ̂ = 0 and r̂t = ̂t. It follows that Ut =
(
1−∑Jj=1 γj −∑Kk=1 δk)U +∑Jj=1 γj(r̂∗t−j r̂∗′t−j) +∑K
k=1 δkUt−k, where r̂
∗
t is standardized r̂t. In other words, in this context, the conditional dynamic
correlations that we estimate by this procedure are equivalent to unconditional dynamic correlations.
Note that Rt can also be constant and equal to R. In such a case, the DCC(J,K) MV-GARCH(P,Q)
model becomes a constant conditional correlation (CCC) MV-GARCH(P,Q) model (Bollerslev, 1990).10
3.3 Empirical Results (1)
The rolling correlations, based on 30-day windows, between the price returns of all pairs of cryptocur-
rencies in the sample are plotted in Figures 1, 2, and 3. In each panel, the solid thin lines represent the
estimated rolling correlations; the dashed lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the correspond-
ing 95% confidence bands; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application of a
standard Hodrick-Prescott filter. The estimated correlations based on 60-day rolling windows are similar
to the correlations based on 30-day rolling windows for all pairs of cryptocurrencies.11
The eight estimated DCC(1,1) MV-GARCH(P,Q) models are reported in Tables 1 and 2. Each
model is based on a different set of two to nine cryptocurrency price returns and is estimated on different
common samples, from the shortest (when all cryptocurrencies are included) to the longest (when only two
cryptocurrencies are included). In all models, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the adjustment
parameters γ and δ in the DCC equation are jointly equal to zero at conventional levels. Similarly,
likelihood ratio tests suggest that the assumption of time-varying (un)conditional correlations between
price returns is more appropriate than the assumption of non-time-varying (un)conditional correlations.
These tests empirically justify our preference for DCC over CCC models.
Dynamic (un)conditional correlations for all pairs of price returns are plotted in Figures 4, 5, and
6. Each panel is based on one of the eight DCC(1,1) MV-GARCH(P,Q) models that we consider. For
each specific pair of cryptocurrencies, we report the dynamic correlations derived from the model that we
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estimate on the longest available common sample of data. The solid thin lines represent the estimated
dynamic correlations; the solid bold lines are correlation trends extracted from the application of a stan-
dard Hodrick-Prescott filter. The horizontal dashed lines represent the constant correlations estimated
in each case from a CCC MV-GARCH(P,Q) model. The remaining two dashed lines represent the upper
and lower bounds of the corresponding 95% confidence bands. In all cases, the dynamic correlations that
we derive from this multivariate modelling approach appear to be qualitatively identical to the rolling
correlations that we estimate in the previously described bivariate setting.
Correlations are almost always positive. Between 2013 and 2016, when we are able to compute
them, they are moderate or low and often close to zero. They are negative only occasionally, notably
between Ethereum and Litecoin in the first half of 2016 and between Bitcoin Cash and Cardano from
the end of 2017 to the beginning of 2018. These findings are unsurprising, given that cryptocurrencies
are, in general, independently created and are based on slightly different platforms, technologies, and
protocols. Thus, they exhibit different features, characteristics, and limitations. An evident exception
is the correlations between Bitcoin and Litecoin price returns, which, on average, stay high and positive
over the entire period under consideration, between 2013 and the end of 2018. As a matter of fact, the
Litecoin network was launched in October 2011 as a fork of the Bitcoin Core client – i.e., the free and
open-source software that serves as a Bitcoin node (the set of which form the Bitcoin network).12 Another
exception is, perhaps, the correlations between Ripple and Stellar price returns, which are consistently
positive and strong throughout the sample. Stellar shares similarities with Ripple and was founded by
one of Ripple’s co-founders. Virtually all currency correlations drastically go up between the beginning
of 2017 and the end of 2018, when they remain positive but, in most cases, noticeably flex downwards.13
From an investment perspective, if an asset is negatively correlated with another asset, putting them
together in a portfolio tends to reduce the risk of that portfolio. If an asset has a weak positive correlation
with another asset, then it is called a diversifier. An asset that is uncorrelated (negatively correlated)
with another asset is said to be a weak (strong) hedge. Finally, an asset that is uncorrelated (negatively
correlated) with another asset during times of distress is considered a weak (strong) safe haven.14 The
empirical evidence that we present in this section supports the view that, until the end of 2016, most
virtual currencies in the sample were diversifiers of each other and that some of them could even be seen
as weak hedges. However, given the sharp comovement increases that we document in the last two years
of data, these conclusions do not seem to empirically hold at the end of 2018.
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4 Detecting Instability in Cryptocurrency Markets
Failing to recognize unstable dynamics in cryptocurrency markets, as in any other markets, may have
serious implications on financial investments and economic policies. Identifying bubbles and/or periods of
distress, especially in real time, is not easy. Recently, several tests for the empirical detection of bubbles
in price data have been developed. Some of these tests are based on a combination of econometric
techniques and theoretical arguments derived from asset pricing theory. The main idea behind some of
these statistical tools is that, if a bubble develops at some point in time in a given market, relative prices
should exhibit, at least locally and temporarily, an explosive dynamic behavior.
Empirical strategies for bubble detection are found in Phillips and Yu (2011) and Phillips et al.
(2015), who show how to formally date-stamp bubbles in asset price data. They propose a rolling right-
tail variation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF ) unit root test in which, under the null hypothesis,
the time series of interest has a unit root and, under the alternative, the time series has, at least locally,
a root larger than one – i.e., that time series is representable as a mildly explosive stochastic process.
Phillips et al. (2015) maintain that, if the null is rejected, a version of their procedure based on recursive
and flexible windows can be used, under general regularity conditions, as a date-stamping strategy able
to consistently estimate the origination and termination of multiple bubbles in long time series. Through
simulations, they demonstrate that their strategy outperforms Phillips and Yu (2011)’s approach.
A period of mildly explosive behavior in the time series of a cryptocurrency NVT ratio, if associated
with a quickly rising ratio, can be viewed as a bubble in the underlying market. A period of mild
explosiveness associated with a falling NVT ratio can, possibly, be interpreted as a period of rapid value
adjustment. More broadly and depending on the specific context, such empirical strategy can identify
episodes of distress, exuberance, and collapse; as well as structural breaks, periods of regime change, or
incidents of panic and turmoil. In this paper, we show that the periods of mildly explosive behavior that
we detect in the six NVT ratios in the sample, especially when such ratios exhibit an upward sloping
trajectory, often corresponds to well-known episodes of turmoil in cryptocurrency markets. We argue
that such episodes can be viewed as bubbles, financial distress, or panic across these markets.
4.1 Testing for Mildly Explosive Behavior
The formal statistical test for the detection of mild explosiveness is based on a reduced-form equation,
yt = µ+ δyt−1 +
∑p
i=1 φi∆yt−i + εt, where yt is the time series of interest. In this work, yt is the moving
average of a cryptocurrency NVT ratio over rolling windows of 30 or 60 days. µ is an intercept, p is the
maximum number of lags that we want to allow (30, if the moving average is based on a 30-day rolling
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window; 60, if it is based on a 60-day rolling window), and εt is a conventional error term. The testing
strategy is a right-tail variation of the standard ADF unit root test. As in Phillips et al. (2015), the null
and alternative hypotheses are, respectively, H0 : δ = 1 and H1 : δ > 1. The original sample interval
of T observations is rescaled to the compact interval [0, 1]. The δ coefficient, estimated by ordinary
least squares over the (rescaled) sample [r1, r2] ⊆ [0, 1], and its corresponding ADF test statistic are
denoted by δr1,r2 and ADFr1,r2 , respectively. The (fractional) window size of the regression is defined as
rw = r2 − r1. The Generalized Supremum ADF (GSADF ) test is derived from a recursive procedure
in which the ADF test statistic is calculated over (overlapping) rolling windows of increasing sizes and
moving starting points (i.e., over a forward rolling and expanding sample). Each iteration of this recursive
approach produces an estimated equation over a different (rescaled) sample and an associated ADF test
statistic. The GSADF test statistic is computed as supremum ADFr1,r2 , over all possible windows,
GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
{ADFr1,r2}, where r0 is the smallest sample window width fraction (we set it
to 10%) and 1 is the largest window width fraction (corresponding to the full sample size) in the recursion.
The critical values are simulated. First, we generate a random sample of T observations from a
null model. As in Phillips et al. (2015), it is a random walk with an asymptotically negligible drift,
yt = dT
−η + θyt−1 + et, et ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
, θ = d = η = 1, where η is a localizing coefficient that controls
the magnitude of the drift as T −→ ∞ and et is a normal error term. Second, we recursively estimate
the initial reduced-form equation by least squares over the sample generated by the null model using the
aforementioned recursive mechanism, and store the resulting GSADF test statistic. Third, we repeat first
and second steps 1000 times. The p-value for the computed test statistic is p (τ̂) = 11000
∑1000
j=1 I (τj > τ̂),
where τ̂ is the sample GSADF statistic, I (·) is an indicator function such that I (τj > τ̂) = 1 if τj > τ̂
and I (τj > τ̂) = 0 if τj 6 τ̂ , and {τj}1,000j=1 is the sequence of simulated GSADF statistics.
4.2 Date-Stamping Periods of Mildly Explosive Behavior
Under general regularity conditions, if the null hypothesis of the test is rejected, we can consistently
estimate origination and termination of periods of mild explosiveness by means of a recursive ADF test
based on backward expanding samples and on an algorithm that works specularly to the one that we
outlined in the previous subsection. The end point of each sample, r2, now moves backwards, whereas
the start point is allowed to vary from 0 to r2 − r0. For each r2, we obtain a sequence of ADF test
statistics, {ADFr1,r2}r1∈[0,r2−r0]. The Backward Supremum ADF test statistic is the supremum of the
ADF test statistic sequence over this interval, BSADFr2 (r0) = sup
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
{ADFr1,r2}.
An estimate of the beginning (r̂e) of a period of mild explosiveness (as fraction of the full sample) is
12
given by r̂e = inf
r2∈[0,1]
{
r2 : BSADFr2 (r0) > cv
βT
r2
}
, where cvβTr2 is the 100 (1− βT ) % critical value of the
BSADF test statistic based on Tr2 observations and βT is a real number between 0 and 1 that indicates
the level of significance of the test, in this paper set to a conventional 10%. An estimate of the termination
(r̂f ) of a period of mild explosiveness is determined as r̂f = inf
r2∈[r̂e,1]
{
r2 : BSADFr2 (r0) < cv
βT
r2
}
. The
origination (termination) date is the observation in correspondence to which the BSADF statistic exceeds
(falls below) the critical value of the BSADF statistic. GSADF test and BSADF test statistics are
related to each other as GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
{BSADFr2 (r0)}.
4.3 Empirical Results (2)
Table 3 shows the outcome of the battery of GSADF tests that we run on the 30-day and 60-day moving
averages of the NVT ratios in the sample. The table includes information about the cryptocurrency-
specific periods over which we are able to derive such variables. These tests signal the presence of mild
explosiveness in all six cryptocurrencies that we consider in this analysis, namely Bitcoin, Ethereum,
Bitcoin Cash, Stellar, Litecoin, and Cardano. The periods of mildly explosive behavior that we estimate
are graphically represented in Figures 7 and 8 as grey overlays on each NVT ratio series. In these figures,
we also plot the sequences of BSADF test statistics and the corresponding simulated critical values that
we need to date-stamp mild explosiveness. In Table 4, we spell out all date-stamped periods, their lengths
(expressed in days), and whether they are associated with generally rising or falling NVT ratios.
All six cryptocurrencies exhibit multiple and frequent periods of mild explosiveness. Ethereum is the
cryptocurrency that seems to be the least affected by distress. Over a sample of a little more than three
years, only one period of instability is detected in the 30-day moving-average time series of Ethereum’s
NVT ratio. Such period covers 3.30% of the observations in the sample over which the statistical procedure
that we describe in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 is able to produce results (henceforth, in this section of empirical
results: the relevant sample observations). Three periods of instability are, instead, detected in the 60-
day moving-average time series of Ethereum’s NVT ratio. These three spells correspond to a total of
14.98% of the relevant sample observations. Ethereum’s mild explosiveness is associated with a rising
NVT ratio between October and November 2017. Based on our definition, this period is the only spell of
bubble-like behavior that we are able to identify for this cryptocurrency. However, over that time span,
the NVT ratio increase is so moderate that the presence of an actual bubble is debatable.
Statistical instability is much more common in the remaining five cryptocurrencies. Over a time span
of five and a half years, Bitcoin is characterized by several periods of turmoil that last many months. The
two moving-average time series of Bitcoin’s NVT ratio exhibit mild explosiveness five times each. In the
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30-day moving average, 44.03% of the relevant sample observations corresponds to periods of instability;
the corresponding proportion in the 60-day moving average is 34.04%. In both cases, three occurrences of
instability are associated with a quickly rising NVT ratio and can be interpreted as bubbles. A significant
long-lasting bubble occurs between April and October 2014. Another spell of bubble-like behavior covers
a lengthy period of almost nine months between March 2018 and the end of November 2018.
Based on the analysis of the 30-day moving-average time series of its NVT ratio, distress is experienced
seven times by Bitcoin Cash in just fifteen months (54.17% of the relevant sample observations). Unstable
dynamics are found five times in the 60-day moving-average time series (65.26% of the relevant sample
observations). Two lengthy spells of bubble-like behavior are seen between January and April 2018 and
then, again, between July and September 2018. Bitcoin Cash’s last two months in the sample are, instead,
characterized by a rapid and mildly explosive collapse of the NVT ratio.
In less than three years, five periods of turmoil are detected in the 30-day moving-average of Stellar’s
NVT ratio (27.47% of the relevant sample observations); the 60-day moving-average becomes mildly
explosive six times (42.57% of the relevant sample observations). After some turbulence in mid-2016,
bubble-like dynamics are identified in the second half of 2017 and between March and August 2018.
The 30-day and 60-day moving-average time series of Litecoin’s NVT ratio display unstable dynamics
four and five times, respectively, over a span of almost five years. These occurrences of instability cover
19.45% and 24.40% of the relevant sample observations. After a long bubble-like episode between October
2014 and April 2015, the most recent (and also longest) spell starts in March 2018 and continues until
November of the same year. At the end of the sample, Litecoin’s distress does not appear to be over, yet.
Finally, in just thirteen months, five and four spells of distress are estimated, respectively, in the
30-day and 60-day moving-average time series of Cardano’s NVT ratio. Such spells extend over 52.12%
and 72.48% of the relevant sample observations and generally exhibit bubble-like behavior, especially
between April and November 2018, when Cardano seems to be still in a state of turmoil.
Across all six cryptocurrencies, we detect twenty-seven episodes of turmoil in the 30-day moving-
average time series of their NVT ratios and classify eighteen of them as bubbles. In the 60-day moving-
average time series, we are able to see twenty-eight periods of distress and classify fourteen of them as
bubbles. Barring Bitcoin, a clear pattern is that the 60-day moving-average time series of the NVT
ratios in the dataset are characterized by longer periods of mild explosiveness than their 30-day moving-
average counterparts. Overall, the six cryptocurrencies are in a state of distress for significant portions
of their samples. This specific finding casts doubts on their usefulness as store of value (as conventional
currencies) and may discourage risk-averse investors from looking at them as viable investment options.
Furthermore, for most part of 2018, Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Cardano appear to be in an almost syn-
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chronized bubble-like state. During the final months of 2018, Bitcoin Cash experiences some turmoil,
which is, however, associated with a falling NVT ratio. At the same time, Stellar’s NVT ratio stays flat,
after the turbulence of mid-2018. The significant and protracted distress that we detect in 2018 in several
of these currencies is coincident with the generally rising correlations that we document in Section 3.3.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive empirical examination of the price dynamics of an extended set
of nine major cryptocurrencies. We focus on the degree of comovement of their price returns and carefully
study its time evolution by adopting a bivariate and a multivariate modelling approach. Moreover, we
test cryptocurrency markets for statistical signs of instability using a state-of-the-art testing and date-
stamping algorithm. Cryptocurrency markets change quickly and it is, in general, challenging to find
long-run trends. Nonetheless, the statistical evidence that we provide leads to two general takeaways.
First, from a financial investment point of view and until the end of 2016, most virtual currencies in
the sample are diversifiers of each other and some of them may be even seen as weak hedges. This claim
is based on the finding – which we report in Section 3 – that almost all estimated dynamic correlations
between cryptocurrency price returns are either moderately positive or positive and low, often close to
zero, from the beginning of the sample through late 2016. However, moving forward, the pronounced
comovement increases that we document in approximately the last two years of data, between the begin-
ning of 2017 and the end of 2018, suggest that such conclusions should probably be reconsidered. Second,
consistent with the conventional wisdom, we find most cryptocurrencies in the dataset to often exhibit
pervasive signs of turbulence for significant portions of their samples. For the reasons that we mention
in Section 4, several of the spells of distress that we statistically detect may be interpreted as bubbles.
We also determine that, for most part of 2018 and by the end of the same year, Bitcoin, Litecoin, and
Cardano appear to be in an almost synchronized and very noticeable bubble-like state.
On the one hand, despite being based on different technologies and protocols, and created with
slightly diverse objectives, in the last few years, several cryptocurrencies have been characterized, to a
non-negligible extent, by evidently common price behaviors.15 The objective predominance of Bitcoin is
suggestive of the fact that the world-wide financial transactions that concern this specific virtual currency
might have non-trivial spillover effects on the evolution of other (major) cryptocurrency prices.16 Perhaps,
investors consider cryptocurrencies as a group rather than individual projects with unique trajectories
and only a few of them make investment decisions based on intensive research. If investors have correlated
demands across cryptocurrencies, a common component might drive cryptocurrency prices. Currencies
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that exhibit similar investor bases might also exhibit strong comovement in their returns. Likely, retail
investors tend to be exposed to behavioral biases. It is, however, a fact that investors must first buy
Bitcoin or Ethereum before they can exchange these for the desired cryptocurrency. These factors are,
maybe, what has been pushing the dominance of Bitcoin over the market, resulting in a “follow the leader”
behavior. A formal factor analysis may shed some light on the validity of some of these assertions.
On the other hand, the growing empirical literature on cryptocurrency price dynamics, the casual
and informal observation of cryptocurrency markets, and the elements and patterns that we document
in the present work leave no or very little doubt on the existence of frequent occurrences of distress
and bubbles in major virtual currency markets. Furthermore, even though some work has already been
done on the topic, it is still difficult to claim anything certain about what drives prices in and across
cryptocurrency markets; what determines cryptocurrency values; and what factors, if any, represent the
common denominator(s) of these seemingly unrelated assets. Yet, our comovement analysis suggests that,
in the last couple of years, several major virtual currencies might have been affected by shocks in a fairly
similar fashion.
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Notes
1Note the following: (i) Ethereum is a global, open-source platform for decentralized applications and Ether is its
native currency; (ii) Ripple is an independent digital asset that is native to the Ripple Consensus Ledger, which employs the
decentralized cryptocurrency known as XRP. In this paper, as it is customary and unless it is noted otherwise, we conveniently
use the words “Ethereum” or “Ether” and “Ripple” or “XRP” interchangeably to refer to the two cryptocurrencies.
2In a broad financial sense, the many existing cryptocurrencies could be seen as substitutes, as they compete against
each other for market share in a currently small but expanding market. Their degree of substitution may vary, depending on
technological overlap or improvement and target consumers (Bitcoin and Litecoin can be thought of as perfect substitutes;
Ripple, Ethereum, and Bitcoin have different target consumers). If so, their degree of price comovement could be expected
to be negative, or positive and low, if one considers the fact they all work on similar blockchain technologies.
3Cryptocurrency market capitalization – one way to assess the size of the market – is computed by multiplying the total
of all issued coins derived from mining (circulating supply of cryptocurrencies) by the current cryptocurrency market price.
4A correlation coefficient that, in absolute value, lies between 0.50 and 1.00 defines a strong or high correlation. If it lies
between 0.30 and 0.49, it defines a medium or moderate correlation. If it lies below 0.30, it defines a small or low correlation.
5Not all cryptocurrencies are created equal. One distinguishing characteristic concerns their supply: while Ethereum,
Stellar, EOS, and Monero have unlimited supply, the supply of Bitcoin, Ripple, Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin, and Cardano is
limited by design. Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash have reached levels of circulating supply that are close to their upper bounds.
6According to Coin Metrics, at least as we write this paper: (i) Monero has no transaction value data because it uses
confidential transactions and it is cryptographically impossible to know the size of such transactions; (ii) EOS has breaks
in the transaction value data because there were periods of it being oﬄine; and (iii) Ripple data is irregular and it is near
impossible to run a fully validating node; given that we can only rely on their application programming interface (API),
which is rather limited, it is not recommended to use such data for an academic study.
7Furthermore, as the creators of the NVT ratio repeatedly emphasize, their indicator is strongly dependent on the
assumption that different cryptoassets are roughly comparable in the prevalence of change outputs.
8Multivariate normality for r̂t is not strictly required for consistency and asymptotic normality of these estimators. If
returns have non-normal innovations, the DCC estimator is a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator and is still consistent.
9GARCH restrictions for the non-negativity of the conditional variances and for their non-unit root behavior are imposed.
10Without loss of generality and to ensure convergence of the implemented algorithm(s), J and K are set equal to 1.
11The empirical outcomes based on 60-day rolling windows are reported in Figures OA1, OA2, and OA3 (Online Appendix).
12The Bitcoin Core client provides a wallet that verifies payments. It is considered to be Bitcoin’s reference implementation.
13The dynamic (un)conditional variances from the eight DCC(1,1) MV-GARCH(P,Q) models are plotted in Figure OA4,
in the Online Appendix. For each cryptocurrency, we report the dynamic variances from the model that we estimate on the
longest common sample. All cryptocurrencies exhibit numerous periods of high variance and pronounced volatility clustering.
14Gold, for example, has often been considered a hedge and a safe haven.
15If supply side factors and technological features are essential drivers of the underlying value of a cryptocurrency, currencies
with similar characteristics should exhibit high comovement in price returns.
16Using GARCH-in-mean models, Liu and Serletis (2019) find statistically significant evidence of shock transmission
among the leading cryptocurrencies and spillover effects from cryptocurrency markets to other financial markets in the
United States, as well as in other major economies.
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A Figures
Figure 1: Rolling Correlations (30-Day Rolling Windows) of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (1)
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Figure 2: Rolling Correlations (30-Day Rolling Windows) of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (2)
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Notes. Rolling correlations derived as described in Tang and Xiong (2012), based on 30-day windows, between the price returns of all pairs of cryptocurrencies
in the sample. The solid thin lines represent the estimated rolling correlations; the dashed lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding
95% confidence bands; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Figure 3: Rolling Correlations (30-Day Rolling Windows) of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (3)
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Notes. Rolling correlations derived as described in Tang and Xiong (2012), based on 30-day windows, between the price returns of all pairs of cryptocurrencies
in the sample. The solid thin lines represent the estimated rolling correlations; the dashed lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding
95% confidence bands; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Figure 4: Dynamic (Un)Conditional Correlations of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (1)
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Notes. Dynamic (un)conditional correlations derived as described in Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002) for all pairs of cryptocurrency price
returns. Each panel is based on one of the eight DCC(1,1) MV-GARCH(P,Q) models that we consider. For each specific pair of cryptocurrencies, we report
the dynamic correlations from the model that we estimate on the longest available common sample of data (the estimation group number is indicated
for each plot). The solid thin lines represent the estimated dynamic correlations; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application
of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter; the horizontal dashed lines in the middle represent the constant correlations estimated in each case from a CCC
MV-GARCH(P,Q) model; the remaining two dashed line respectively represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding 95% confidence bands.
The complete set of results is available upon request.
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Figure 5: Dynamic (Un)Conditional Correlations of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (2)
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Notes. Dynamic (un)conditional correlations derived as described in Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002) for all pairs of cryptocurrency price
returns. Each panel is based on one of the eight DCC(1,1) MV-GARCH(P,Q) models that we consider. For each specific pair of cryptocurrencies, we report
the dynamic correlations from the model that we estimate on the longest available common sample of data (the estimation group number is indicated
for each plot). The solid thin lines represent the estimated dynamic correlations; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application
of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter; the horizontal dashed lines in the middle represent the constant correlations estimated in each case from a CCC
MV-GARCH(P,Q) model; the remaining two dashed line respectively represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding 95% confidence bands.
The complete set of results is available upon request.
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Figure 6: Dynamic (Un)Conditional Correlations of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (3)
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Notes. Dynamic (un)conditional correlations derived as described in Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002) for all pairs of cryptocurrency price
returns. Each panel is based on one of the eight DCC(1,1) MV-GARCH(P,Q) models that we consider. For each specific pair of cryptocurrencies, we report
the dynamic correlations from the model that we estimate on the longest available common sample of data (the estimation group number is indicated
for each plot). The solid thin lines represent the estimated dynamic correlations; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application
of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter; the horizontal dashed lines in the middle represent the constant correlations estimated in each case from a CCC
MV-GARCH(P,Q) model; the remaining two dashed line respectively represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding 95% confidence bands.
The complete set of results is available upon request.
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Figure 7: Mildly Explosive Behavior in Cryptocurrency NVT Ratios (30-Day Average)
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Notes. Date-stamping periods of mildly explosive behavior in six major cryptocurrencies. Sequence of BSADF test statistics and corresponding sequence
of critical values in the upper panel of each plot. Shaded areas represent periods of mildly explosive behavior in the time series of cryptocurrency NVT
ratios (30-day average). Level of the testing procedure: 10%.
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Figure 8: Mildly Explosive Behavior in Cryptocurrency NVT Ratios (60-Day Average)
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Notes. Date-stamping periods of mildly explosive behavior in six major cryptocurrencies. Sequence of BSADF test statistics and corresponding sequence
of critical values in the upper panel of each plot. Shaded areas represent periods of mildly explosive behavior in the time series of cryptocurrency NVT
ratios (60-day average). Level of the testing procedure: 10%.
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B Tables
Table 1: DCC MV-GARCH Models for Cryptocurrency Price Returns (1)
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Notes. As in Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002), the estimates in the GARCH Equations correspond to hm,t = ωm +
∑Pm
p=1 αm,pr̂
2
m,t−p +∑Qm
q=1 βm,phm,t−q for m = 1, 2, ..., S, where S is the number of cryptocurrencies in each estimation group (in this table, S = 9, 8, 7, 6, 5) and r̂m is the
demeaned price returns. For each m, Pm and Qm are integers between 1 and 30 chosen according to the Schwarz Information Criterion. The estimates in the
DCC Equations are based on the process Ut =
(
1 −∑Jj=1 γj −∑Kk=1 δk)U +∑Jj=1 γj(r̂∗t−j r̂∗′t−j) +∑Kk=1 δkUt−k, where r̂∗t is r̂t = (r̂1,t, r̂2,t, ..., r̂S,t)′
standardized by the corresponding standard deviations, and U is the unconditional covariance of the standardized residuals resulting from the first-stage
estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimation samples start on the date indicated under the group number and all end on 11/25/2018.
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Table 2: DCC MV-GARCH Models for Cryptocurrency Price Returns (2)
GARCH
Equations
BTC XRP LTC XMR BTC XRP LTC BTC LTC
⍵ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
⍺1 0.135 0.326 0.086 0.117 0.116 0.329 0.065 0.127 0.087
(0.0281) (0.1905) (0.021) (0.0343) (0.0313) (0.152) (0.0262) (0.0369) (0.0158)
⍺2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0054) (0.006) (0.0094)
⍺3 0.000
(0.0065)
⍺4 0.000
(0.0103)
⍺5 0.039
(0.0391)
β1 0.856 0.637 0.868 0.830 0.881 0.668 0.871 0.868 0.889
(0.0292) (0.1598) (0.03) (0.0518) (0.0354) (0.1253) (0.0142) (0.0404) (0.0141)
β2
DCC
Equation
𝛾 0.060 0.076 0.114
(0.0162) (0.0176) (0.0327)
δ 0.931 0.910 0.877
(0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0363)
Group 7 (S=3) Group 8 (S=2)
05/22/2014 08/05/2013 04/29/2013
Group 6 (S=4)
Notes. As in Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002), the estimates in the GARCH Equations correspond to hm,t = ωm +
∑Pm
p=1 αm,pr̂
2
m,t−p +∑Qm
q=1 βm,phm,t−q for m = 1, 2, ..., S, where S is the number of cryptocurrencies in each estimation group (in this table, S = 4, 3, 2) and r̂m is the demeaned
price returns. For each m, Pm and Qm are integers between 1 and 30 chosen according to the Schwarz Information Criterion. The estimates in the DCC
Equations are based on the process Ut =
(
1 −∑Jj=1 γj −∑Kk=1 δk)U + ∑Jj=1 γj(r̂∗t−j r̂∗′t−j) + ∑Kk=1 δkUt−k, where r̂∗t is r̂t = (r̂1,t, r̂2,t, ..., r̂S,t)′
standardized by the corresponding standard deviations, and U is the unconditional covariance of the standardized residuals resulting from the first-stage
estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimation samples start on the date indicated under the group number and all end on 11/25/2018.
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Table 3: Right-Tail Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests on Cryptocurrency NVT Ratios
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Notes. Right-tail ADF tests, as described in Phillips et al. (2015), that we run individually on the NVT ratios of six cryptocurrencies. We find statistical
evidence of mildly explosive behavior in all six cryptocurrencies. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; * denotes statistical significance at
the 10% level. Schwarz Information Criterion is used to select optimal lag in test regressions. 30 days is maximum lag length considered on 30-day average
of computed NVT ratios; 60 days is maximum lag length considered on 60-day average of computed NVT ratios. Critical values: simulated using 1000
replications. Initial window size: 10% of full sample.
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Table 4: Periods of Mildly Explosive Behavior in Cryptocurrency NVT Ratios
Cryptocurrency
Periods of Mildly
Explosive Behavior
(NVT Ratio, 30-Day Average)
Periods of Mildly
Explosive Behavior
(NVT Ratio, 60-Day Average)
Bitcoin [5(3), 5(3)] 02/02/2014 - 03/06/2014 (33 days) 05/06/2014 - 05/21/2014* (16 days)
04/06/2014 - 10/02/2014* (180 days) 09/21/2015 - 12/26/2015 (97 days)
02/09/2015 - 03/26/2015* (46 days) 02/16/2016 - 07/18/2016* (154 days)
08/09/2015 - 05/04/2016 (270 days) 05/08/2017 - 07/21/2017 (75 days)
03/03/2018 - 11/25/2018* (268 days) 03/06/2018 - 11/25/2018* (265 days)
Ethereum [1(1), 3(1)] 10/05/2017 - 11/08/2017* (35 days) 02/22/2016 - 04/07/2016 (46 days)
08/03/2016 - 09/28/2016 (57 days)
10/08/2017 - 11/28/2017* (52 days)
Bitcoin Cash [7(3), 5(2)] 10/18/2017 - 12/23/2017 (67 days) 11/11/2017 - 12/28/2017 (48 days)
01/21/2018 - 04/02/2018* (72 days) 01/27/2018 - 04/17/2018* (81 days)
05/02/2018 - 05/22/2018 (21 days) 05/16/2018 - 05/31/2018 (16 days)
06/18/2018 - 07/04/2018* (17 days) 07/10/2018 - 09/11/2018* (64 days)
08/04/2018 - 08/12/2018* (9 days) 10/18/2018 - 11/25/2018 (39 days)
09/22/2018 - 10/05/2018 (14 days)
11/05/2018 - 11/25/2018 (21 days)
Stellar [5(4), 6(3)] 05/04/2016 - 06/11/2016* (39 days) 05/14/2016 - 07/01/2016* (49 days)
02/06/2017 - 04/03/2017 (57 days) 02/16/2017 - 05/19/2017 (93 days)
09/22/2017 - 10/17/2017* (26 days) 06/16/2017 - 06/28/2017* (13 days)
03/01/2018 - 04/13/2018* (44 days) 09/23/2017 - 11/20/2017* (59 days)
05/19/2018 - 08/30/2018* (104 days) 01/08/2018 - 01/26/2018 (19 days)
03/15/2018 - 09/04/2018* (174 days)
Litecoin [4(4), 5(3)] 10/12/2014 - 12/17/2014* (67 days) 10/17/2014 - 01/09/2015* (85 days)
10/01/2016 - 10/17/2016* (17 days) 03/28/2015 - 04/16/2015* (20 days)
03/06/2017 - 03/12/2017* (7 days) 06/16/2016 - 07/25/2016 (40 days)
03/10/2018 - 11/25/2018* (261 days) 12/15/2017 - 01/06/2018 (23 days)
03/04/2018 - 11/25/2018* (267 days)
Cardano [5(3), 4(2)] 12/27/2017 - 01/01/2018 (6 days) 01/04/2018 - 01/28/2018 (25 days)
01/29/2018 - 02/08/2018* (11 days) 03/12/2018 - 04/14/2018 (34 days)
03/05/2018 - 03/22/2018 (18 days) 05/02/2018 - 08/17/2018* (108 days)
04/14/2018 - 06/17/2018* (65 days) 09/17/2018 - 11/25/2018* (70 days)
09/03/2018 - 11/25/2018* (84 days)
Notes. Periods of mildly explosive behavior in six major cryptocurrencies, as graphically represented in Figures 7 and 8. During the periods in bold and
with an asterisk, the corresponding cryptocurrencies exhibit bubble-like behavior, turmoil, or distress (mild explosiveness and generally rising NVT ratios).
The remaining are periods during which the corresponding cryptocurrencies experience a quick adjustment (mild explosiveness and generally falling NVT
ratios). We also report the length (expressed in days) of the estimated periods of mild explosiveness. In the first column, in square brackets next to the
name of each cryptocurrency, we refer to the following sequence of numbers, [A (B) , C (D)]: A is the number of periods of mild explosiveness that we
detect in the time series of the 30-day moving average of a cryptocurrency NVT ratio; B is the number of periods of mild explosiveness that we classify as
bubbles in that cryptocurrency market; C is the number of periods of mild explosiveness that we detect in the time series of the 60-day moving average of
a cryptocurrency NVT ratio; D is the number of periods of mild explosiveness that we classify as bubbles in that cryptocurrency market.
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Highlights
• We analyze nine major cryptocurrencies between April 2013 and November 2018.
• We estimate the time variation in the correlations of their price returns by means of bivariate and
multivariate modelling approaches and find it to be pronounced.
• These correlations are generally increasing between early 2017 and late 2018.
• By means of a right-tail variation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, we identify and date-stamp
periods of mildly explosive behavior (bubbles and/or distress) in cryptocurrency markets.
• We show statistically significant evidence of frequent mild explosiveness in all cryptocurrencies.
• Mild explosiveness is simultaneous in several major cryptocurrencies at the end of 2017 and in 2018.
Online Appendix
Figure OA1: Rolling Correlations (60-Day Rolling Windows) of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (1)
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Notes. Rolling correlations derived as described in Tang and Xiong (2012), based on 60-day windows, between the price returns of all pairs of cryptocurrencies
in the sample. The solid thin lines represent the estimated rolling correlations; the dashed lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding
95% confidence bands; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Figure OA2: Rolling Correlations (60-Day Rolling Windows) of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (2)
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Notes. Rolling correlations derived as described in Tang and Xiong (2012), based on 60-day windows, between the price returns of all pairs of cryptocurrencies
in the sample. The solid thin lines represent the estimated rolling correlations; the dashed lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding
95% confidence bands; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Figure OA3: Rolling Correlations (60-Day Rolling Windows) of Cryptocurrency Price Returns (3)
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Notes. Rolling correlations derived as described in Tang and Xiong (2012), based on 60-day windows, between the price returns of all pairs of cryptocurrencies
in the sample. The solid thin lines represent the estimated rolling correlations; the dashed lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the corresponding
95% confidence bands; the solid bold lines are correlation trends derived from the application of a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Figure OA4: Dynamic (Un)Conditional Variances of Cryptocurrency Price Returns
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Notes. Dynamic (un)conditional variances derived as described in Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002) for all cryptocurrency price returns. Each
panel is based on one of the eight DCC(1,1) MV-GARCH(P,Q) models that we consider. For each specific cryptocurrency, we report the dynamic variance
from the model that we estimate on the longest available common sample of data (the estimation group number is indicated for each plot). The complete
set of results is available upon request.
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